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I. INTRODUCTION
This note examines an alleged conflict within the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit over the proper role of prosecution history in claim
construction and explains how a linguistic method of evaluating evidence can
improve consistency and conviction within the Federal Circuit. This issue was the
subject of the denied petition for certiorari1 from the Federal Circuit case Cioffi v.
Google, Inc.,2 in which Google argues that the Federal Circuit has been “deeply
conflicted” over the availability and proper role of prosecution history in
construing disputed claim language,3 and that it has restricted its use to the
doctrine of disclaimer.4 This approach has been called the “disclaimer only”
standard and treats prosecution history as being a relevant source of context only if
it clearly and unmistakably disavows claim scope.5
Modern Federal Circuit precedent recognizes the importance of
prosecution history.6 Google argues7 the Federal Circuit’s clear and unmistakable
approach applies to amendments made during prosecution, which results in the
inventor receiving the benefit of the doubt rather than the public.8 This is
controversial because the Supreme Court has long held that claim amendments
contained within the prosecution history should be strictly construed against the
applicant and in favor of the public.9

1

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google, Inc. v. Alfonso Cioffi, et al., (No. 16-200), 2016 WL 4363496.
632 F. App’x 1013, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2015) petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 10, 2016) (No. 16-200).
3
Google filed a petition for certiorari on August 10th, 2016, alleging that the Federal Circuit has been
conflicted over the significance given to a patent’s prosecution history in claim construction for years,
and that this uncertainty is resulting in confusion over claim construction standards, leading to
confusion in litigation and among inventors attempting to determine the scope of an issued patent
during product or licensing decisions. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.
4
Cioffi v. Google, Inc. is an unpublished and non-precedential decision. However, it is important as the
recently denied petition for certiorari in the case of Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc. presented analogous
arguments to the questions presented to the Supreme Court for review in Cioffi, chief among them that
the Federal Circuit has limited prosecution history usage in claim construction to the doctrine o105f
disclaimer. Compare Cioffi, 632 F. App'x at 1024; Vederi, 744 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
denied 135 S. Ct. 2856, 192 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2015). with Fenner Investments, Ltd. v. Cellco P'ship, 778
F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
5
See Poly-Am., L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., No. 2016-1200, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18486 at *1 (Fed. Cir.
Oct. 14, 2016) (holding the prosecution history of Poly-America’s patent was consulted specifically for
the purpose of finding a clear and unequivocal statement by the inventor that disavowed claim scope).
6
See Fenner, 778 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]ny explanation, elaboration, or qualification presented by the
inventor during patent examination is relevant” during the process of claim construction.).
7
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 19.
8
See Cioffi, 632 F. App’x at 1013; Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1384.
9
Historically, the Supreme Court clearly intended to give the benefit of the doubt in claim amendmentscope disputes to the public rather than the inventor. This approach is called “strictly construing
amendments against the patentee.” See Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137 (1942);
Keystone Driller Co. v. Nw. Eng’g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 (1935); Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club,
Inc., 282 U.S. 784, 789–90 (1931); I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 443–44
(1926); and Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 84 (1900).
2
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Google presented these issues to the Supreme Court for review in a
petition for certiorari in Google, Inc., v. Alfonso Cioffi, et al.10 The question before
the Federal Circuit in Cioffi11 was whether the District Court had erroneously
construed the terms “web browser process” and “critical file” in Cioffi’s issued
patent.12 The Federal Circuit rejected Google’s argument that the prosecution
history provided crucial context that relinquished claim scope and sided with
Cioffi.13 Google asserts the Federal Circuit’s decision applied a standard that is the
subject of conflict within the Federal Circuit and contrary to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd.14 Festo15
governs the relationship between prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of
equivalents16 and should not be consulted for the purpose of governing the role of
the prosecution history in claim construction.17
Another problem is the alleged application of the disclaimer-only
standard to claim amendments made during prosecution.18 This standard presumes
amendments made during prosecution do not automatically disavow claim scope,
allowing for the possibility of the scope in question to remain intact after an
amendment.19 This standard would be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent
if applied in practice, because it may allow the inventor to recapture scope lost
from a narrowing amendment during prosecution.20

10

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i.
See Cioffi, 632 F. App’x at 1014.
12
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 9.
13
In siding with Cioffi, the Federal Circuit stated that “[t]here is be no ‘clear and unmistakable’
disclaimer if a prosecution argument is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation,” and
concluded that Cioffi had given “a reasonable alternative interpretation” during prosecution. See Cioffi,
632 F. App’x at 1021 (citing SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., 415 F.3d 1278, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
14
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 18.
15
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002).
16
URY FISCHER, THE FLORIDA BAR, FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LITIGATION § 21.14 (8th ed. 2014)
(explaining Festo is the primary governing case law on the relationship between prosecution history
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents.)
17
Festo should not be consulted until after claim construction has taken place because it does not
govern the role of prosecution history in claim construction. Cf. Festo, 535 U.S. at 723 (“[A] patent's
scope is not limited to its literal terms, but embraces all equivalents to the claims described.”).
18
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at App. 18.
19
See Poly-Am., L.P., No. 2016-1200 at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 14, 2016) (explaining the prosecution history
was examined for the presence of an unambiguous disclaimer of claim scope, and as one was found, the
contested scope was therefore sacrificed as a condition of the patent grant).
20
See Festo, 535 U.S. at 725 (holding amendments must be strictly construed against the inventor and
in favor of the public, and that the inventor bears the burden of disproving scope disclaimer); Warner–
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997) (explaining the prosecution
history may be used to estop a patentee from recapturing subject matter surrendered by an amendment
as a required condition of obtaining the patent); Hubbel, 179 U.S. 77, 84 (1900). But see Vederi, 744
F.3d at 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding amended claim language deserves no different treatment unless
the applicant showed a “clear and unambiguous” or “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer of claim scope
in the prosecution history); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (holding there was a disclaimer which was not “clear and unmistakable” so the contested
scope was not disavowed).
11
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Clearly, this issue is important21 and the asserted claims deserve to be
analyzed. A single, unified approach to the evidence used in claim construction
would be helpful in avoiding these contentious situations in the future. A look at
simple linguistics can provide an over-arching framework on which a potential
solution can be based.
Discerning the difference between the semantic meaning and the
pragmatic meaning of claim terms gives a better understanding of why context is
so critical to determining the drafter’s intent, which is the ultimate purpose of
claim construction.22 The prosecution history is a pragmatic source that needs to
be allowed to effect claim construction unrestricted in order to arrive at the most
accurate determination of claim scope. Furthermore, evaluating evidence using
linguistics will result in a more unified understanding of the significance of certain
evidence used during claim construction.
The Supreme Court’s denial of Google’s petition for certiorari was proper
because Google’s argument that guidance is “urgently needed to settle a
foundation issue in patent law” 23 fails as its facts are divorced from the argument
presented24 and no substantial precedent exists to show the Federal Circuit has
disregarded the importance of consulting the prosecution history.25 However, the
case raises a legitimate debate over the inconsistent treatment between Federal
Circuit panels over the proper weight to be given to different intrinsic evidentiary
sources in claim construction. The Federal Circuit should resolve this issue by
taking a linguistic approach that takes into consideration both semantic and
pragmatic evidentiary sources simultaneously when examining evidence during
claim construction.

21

“[C]laim construction is overwhelmingly the most critical issue in patent litigation” See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim
Construction: A Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 Mich. Telecomms. & Tech. L. Rev. 243, 246 (2014)).
Furthermore, an Amicus brief was filed in support of Google as petitioner. See Brief of the Internet
Association and Computer Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”) as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Google, Inc., v. Alfonso Cioffi, et al., No. 16-200, 2016 WL 4761715 (asserting
the Federal Circuit’s approach improperly restricts the role of “patent prosecution history in
ascertaining the proper scope of patent claims, incentivizes patent applicants to avoid clarity during
prosecution” and “this rule of construction fosters ambiguity and gamesmanship”).
22
See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(stating that the purpose of claim construction is to “capture the scope of the actual invention” that is
disclosed, described, or patented.).
23
Google’s main position, as advanced in its petition, states that: “Although this Court has always
deemed context to be important to claim construction, panels of the Federal Circuit are divided over its
relevance. As a result, [The Supreme Court’s] guidance is urgently needed to settle this important and
foundational issue in patent law.”). See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.
24
See Dennis Crouch, Strictly Construing Amended Claims Against the Patentee, PATENTLYO, (Feb. 4,
2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/02/strictly-construing-patentee.html (asserting it is
questionable, and potentially dispositive, whether the arguments and issues Google presents are
actually related to the real-life facts of the case).
25
See Kevin Penton, Google IP Prosecution History Arguments Fail, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/863730/ (“While precedent set by the full Federal Circuit is clear that
courts may look at a patent’s prosecution history when trying to figure out the meaning of ambiguous
claims, Google, Inc. instead points to other decisions concerning unrelated legal matters.”).
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II. GENERAL TREATMENT OF PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY AND CLAIM
AMENDMENTS IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
This section summarizes the current use of prosecution history in claim
construction and the problem a real division within the Federal Circuit, or between
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions, would present. Section A briefly
explains the framework of claim interpretation. Section B gives a background of
Google, Inc., v. Cioffi, et al. Section C discusses the allegedly conflicted decisions
of the Federal Circuit regarding the proper significance of prosecution history in
claim construction, and why its use is not actually in danger.
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A. The process of claim language interpretation during claim construction
Before discussing the alleged divide, a basic framework of how a case
gets to and moves through claim construction is important.26 First, the actual
meaning of a claim term must be the subject of a legitimate disagreement.27 The
Federal Circuit has viewed claim construction as being appropriate even when the
term in question has a plain and ordinary meaning.28 Next, if it is determined that
the term needs to be construed, the court will apply existing substantive rules to
the literal claim language in order to define the proper construction and
corresponding scope.29 The initial understanding of the language comes from a
simple reading of the claims, which by definition establishes the boundaries of the
property right to which the inventor is entitled,30 and functions as the starting point
of construction.31

26

See Dennis Crouch, Claim Construction: A Structured Framework, PATENTLYO (Sep. 29, 2009),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/09/claim-construction-a-structured-framework-1.html, (asserting the
role of claim construction plays a key part in nearly every patent case, making understanding the basic
process critical before analyzing specific element of the process); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent
Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49,
67 (2005) (explaining infringement depends in large part on a claim’s boundaries which define the
scope of the right; accordingly, claim constructions are “often dispositive”).
27
See Crouch, supra note 26 (explaining the first step in determining whether construction is required
is establishing a legitimate disagreement. The court will determine whether a legitimate disagreement
exists and whether it is ripe for construction).
28
The decision in the recent case of Clare v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 819 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
has set new precedent by construing a claim that had a well-established plain and ordinary meaning.
See Robert Schaffer & Joseph Richardson, CAFC: Claim Construction is Appropriate Even Where
Term Has a Plain and Ordinary Meaning, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2016/04/10/claim-construction-even-if-ordinary-meaning/id=68149/.
29
See Crouch, supra note 26 (noting there are various substantive principles of construction that are
“generally not in dispute,” and which are used in nearly all claim constructions).
30
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372–74 (1996) (“[A] patent includes one
or more ‘claims,’ which ‘particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.’ 35 U.S.C. § 112. ‘[Furthermore, a] claim covers and secures a
process, a machine, a manufacture, a composition of matter, or a design, but never the function or result
of either, nor the scientific explanation of their operation.’ (citing 6 Lipscomb § 21:17, at 315–316.)
The claim ‘defines the scope of a patent grant,’ and functions to forbid not only exact copies of an
invention, but products that go to ‘the heart of an invention but avoids the literal language of the claim
by making a noncritical change.’”).
31
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 389 (finding claim construction is a matter of law, and that judges must
construe the claim language in question before submitting the question of infringement to a jury); Barry
W. Graham, Markman, Claim Construction, and Webster's New World Dictionary, FULTON COUNTY
DAILY REPORTER, September 1997 (noting trial judges are to consider three sources in “ascertaining
the meaning of a patent claim: the claim language itself, the patent's specification, and the patent's
administrative record in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, often referred to as the prosecution or file
history,” and furthermore, that “these documents form the public record of the patent and constitute
what the Court has termed the “intrinsic” evidence of claim meaning.”).
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The next step is for the court to determine the “ordinary meaning,” which
is considered to be the objective baseline for construction.32 Finding the ordinary
meaning is highly context dependent, as it is the meaning “a person of ordinary
skill in the art” would give to the words of the claim in question in consideration
of any special meaning and usage in their field.33 This sentiment requires the court
to consider the same resources as would the person of ordinary skill in the art: the
patent claims, the specification and the prosecution history.34 Thus, these are the
fundamental evidence sources of claim construction.35
These fundamental source “usually provides the technological and
temporal context to enable the court to ascertain the meaning of the claim to a
person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.”36 Accordingly,
patent claims are interpreted in consideration of this “intrinsic” evidence and
relevant “extrinsic” evidence, such as evidence showing the normal usage of a
term in its field.37 Claim construction ends at the “proper construction” as
determined by the court in a Markman hearing.38
B. The Background of Google, Inc., v. Alfonso Cioffi
The purpose of consulting the prosecution history is to provide relevant
context in order to determine the intent of the inventor.39 However, according to
Google, the Federal Circuit does not appear to have treated the use of prosecution
history to a consistent standard.40 This controversial issue was the basis of the
denied petition for certiorari in the case of Google, Inc., v. Alfonso Cioffi.41

32
The meaning a person ordinarily skilled in art would give to the claim language after considering
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence is the baseline “ordinary meaning” of the claim terms. However, the
ordinary meaning is not the start of claim construction. Crouch, supra note 24; (quoting Vitronics
Corp., v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“There is a heavy presumption in favor of
giving words in a claim the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art.”).
33
See Crouch, supra note 26.
34
Id.
35
Markman, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“The fundamental sources for claim construction are wellestablished and include the patent claims, the specification and the prosecution history.”).
36
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing V-Formation, Inc. v. Benetton
Group SpA, 401 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
37
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (“Although we have emphasized the importance of intrinsic evidence in
claim construction, we have also authorized district courts to rely on extrinsic evidence, which ‘consists
of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
dictionaries and learned treatises.’”).
38
The ruling in a Markman hearing is the result of a Court deciding specifically how to interpret a
claim and what that patent claim means; therefore, Markman hearings establish the legal right of the
patent holder. See Rich Beem, How We Approach Markman Hearings and Claim Construction, BEEM
LAW, http://www.beemlaw.com/video-gallery/markman-hearing-and-claim-construction.
39
See Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding because the prosecution history was written by the applicant in an attempt to explain
their invention to the examiner, the prosecution history is often the best and only reliable evidence of
“how the inventor understood the invention . . . .”) (quoting Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
40
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 12 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has . . . divided internally
and departed from [the Supreme] Court’s precedents. As a result, different panels apply different
canons of construction.”).
41
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 1.
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Alfonso Cioffi and the Estate of Allen Rozman (“Cioffi”), alleged
Google’s famous Chrome web browser infringed four of their patents, and filed
suit against Google on February 5, 2013.42 The District Court construed multiple
terms contained within claims of the four patents in Google’s favor and gave a
ruling of non-infringement.43 Cioffi then appealed, challenging the construction of
two specific claim terms: (1) “web browser process” and (2) “critical file.”44 The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the
District Court’s claim construction on November 17, 2015.45 Google filed a
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court asking two things:
1. When construing a patent claim, should
courts generally consult the prosecution
history as context for resolving ambiguities, or
is prosecution history relevant only if it clearly
and unmistakably disavows claim scope?
2. When a patent applicant has amended a
claim to overcome the Patent and Trademark
Office’s earlier disallowance of the claim,
should a court strictly construe the amended
claim language against the applicant, as the
Supreme Court has held, or consider the
amendment history to be relevant only to the
extent that it clearly and unambiguously
disavows claim scope, as this Court has
held?46
The two questions asked are similar in nature, as both questions concern the
proper role of intrinsic evidence sources when construing claim terms that have no
established or independently known meaning in the art.

42

See Cioffi, 632 F. App’x at 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
45
Id. at 1023–24.
46
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i.
43
44
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C. The critical importance of prosecution history in the construction of
claim language
This section discusses the first question that Google poses in its petition.47
Supreme Court precedent shows that the prosecution history, along with all other
intrinsic evidence, is valuable to interpreting claim terms.48 However, as Google
points out, certain panels of the Federal Circuit have issued decisions that appear
to treat the relevance of the prosecution history to differing standards.49
In Cioffi,50 the Federal Circuit applied the “clear and unmistakable
standard,”51 which is “high and exacting.”52 This has the effect of giving the
prosecution history very little weight in ascertaining the intended scope of the
claim language.53 As a result, any case that follows this standard only consults the
prosecution history to determine if there was clear and unambiguous disavowal of
claim scope.54 The real question, then, does Federal Circuit precedent contradict
itself and present an immediate problem for review by the Supreme Court? In its
petition for certiorari, Google argues that the decision in Cioffi55 applies this
standard56 and cites a number of cases that have applied this standard in the past,
the most recent one being ten years old.57 However, a very recent case, PolyAmerica,58 shows that the Federal Circuit continues to apply this standard under
certain circumstances today.59

47

Id.
“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis . . . it is the single
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp, 90
F.3d at 1582). See also Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1317 (holding that while extrinsic evidence is useful in
some cases, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determine the legally operative meaning of
claim language”); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (explaining allowed claims must
be interpreted in the context of rejected claims).
49
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 13.
50
Cioffi, 632 F. App’x 1013. See also Vederi, 744 F.3d 1376).
51
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at App. 12.
52
See Avid Tech, Inc. v. Harmonic Inc., 812 F.3d 1040, 1045 (Fed Cir. 2016) (noting because the
“clear and unmistakable” standard is high and exacting, the court of appeals disregards the prosecution
history entirely).
53
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 13 (noting because the court, in this line of cases,
first identifies a term’s meaning without reference to the prosecution history, it “examines the
prosecution history only to determine whether it contains a ‘clear and unmistakable disclaimer’ of [the
term’s] meaning.”).
54
Id.
55
See Cioffi, 632 F. App’x 1013.
56
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining the “clear and unmistakable
standard” limits “prosecution history [usage] to the doctrine of disclaimer—that is, to situations in
which there is a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of claim scope.”).
57
See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2005); SanDisk Corp.,
415 F.3d at 1286; Rhodia Chimie v. PPG Indus., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Amgen Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
58
The Court appeared to apply the disclaimer only standard by consulting the prosecution history to if
it contained “clear and unequivocal” statements intending to limit the claim scope of the invention. It
found that it did, which constituted disavowal of the contested scope. See Poly-Am., No. 2016-1200.
59
See id. at 1132 (noting court looks for a clear disclaimer because the question on appeal was whether
the inventor had disclaimed the contented scope during prosecution).
48
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In the overall hierarchy of claim construction, prosecution history
disclaimer has been deemed to trump the argument of claim differentiation,60
except when a clear disclaimer of claim scope is found.61 This means that the
Federal Circuit, in in considering Google’s argument of prosecution history
disclaimer, was able to rule in favor of claim differentiation62 without any conflict
with precedent.
When considering the intent of the applicant, the plain language of the claim
is the starting point for interpretation.63 Google contends the Federal Circuit has
appeared to contradict itself by limiting prosecution history estoppel to the
doctrine of disclaimer.64 However, the most recent Federal Circuit case on this
issue recognizes the importance of the prosecution history in understanding even
the plain meaning of the claim language.65 After all, claim interpretation is
strongly dependent upon context.66 This makes it difficult to see Google’s
argument as wholly substantive—given the precedent indicating otherwise.

60
See Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining
the doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that each claim in a patent has a different
scope and the differences in scope between independent and dependent claims is presumed to be
significant to the extent that the absence of such difference would make the independent claim
superfluous).
61
See Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]here
found, prosecution history disclaimer can overcome the presumption of claim differentiation.”).
62
See Cioffi, 632 F. App’x at 1019 (“We do not find, moreover, that anything in the prosecution history
overcomes the presumption created by these claim differentiation principles.”).
63
Fenner, 778 F.3d at 1323 (“The foundation of judicial claim construction is the ‘written description’
in the specification. The patent statute requires that the claims ‘particularly point[] out and distinctly
claim[] the subject matter’ that the applicant regards as the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).”).
64
See Poly-Am., No. 2016-1200 at 2.
65
See Biogen Idec, Inc., 713 F.3d at 1094 (holding that a claim term’s “ordinary meaning must be
considered in the context of all the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, specification, and
prosecution history”).
66
See Crouch, supra note 26 (asserting the ordinary meaning on which interpretation is based is viewed
through the lens of a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art that is “deemed to read the words used
in the patent documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have knowledge of
any special meaning and usage in the field;” therefore, “claim interpretation is highly context
dependent”).
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The Federal Circuit’s decision in Cioffi67 and Poly-America68 do not
consider all of the contextual intrinsic evidence on the whole. Instead, the Court
establishes a presumed meaning before consulting contextual evidence such as the
prosecution history. This results in a narrower use of the prosecution history, and
as Google argues, limits it to situations where circumstances indicate searching for
a clear disclaimer.69 Despite what Google argues, controlling case law shows the
general availability of consulting the prosecution history during claim construction
is not in danger.70
III. SUPREME COURT V. FEDERAL CIRCUIT TREATMENT OF AMENDMENT CLAIM
SCOPE DISCLAIMER
Section A explains how the Supreme Court has traditionally construed
claim amendments against the patentee. Section B summarizes how the Supreme
Court has departed from this tradional approach and analyzes Google’s argument
that the Federal Circuit’s current approach is the opposite of strict construction.
Section C summarizes Google’s alternative argument that the Federal Circuit’s
approach may violate the public notice function of patent claims. Section D
explains how Festo71 does not control the question of literal interpretation of
ambiguous patent claims during claim construction. Finally, section E evaluates
the reasoning behind Google’s petitions for certiorari.

67
See Cioffi, 632 F. App’x at 1019 (finding because no clear disclaimer was found in the prosecution
history “that anything in the prosecution history overcomes the presumption created by these claim
differentiation principles”).
68
See Poly-Am., No. 2016-1200, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18486 at 2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 14, 2016) (finding
the prosecution history was consulted for the purpose of finding a disclaimer because the question on
appeal was whether scope had been disclaimed during prosecution).
69
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.
70
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d. 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Those sources include “the words
of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic
evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the
art.”) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116); see
also Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc. v. ITC, 383 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
1582–83; Markman, 52 F.3d at 979–80.
71
Festo, 535 U.S. at 734.
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The Supreme Court has traditionally construed
amendments strictly against the applicant

The Supreme Court recently denied a petition for certiorari in the case of
Google, Inc. v. Vederi.72 The issues and arguments in this case are very similar to
the second question raised in Google’s petition for certiorari from Cioffi.73 The
petition compared Federal Circuit and Supreme Court cases to advance its position
that although the Supreme Court’s stance was to strictly construe claims
amendments against the inventor and in favor of the public, the Federal Circuit
repeatedly espoused an opposing view. This accusation must be investigated.
Google insisted that by requiring a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer
of the original claim scope, the Federal Circuit enabled patent applicants to have it
both ways—i.e., applicants may obtain a patent with narrowed claims while
retaining the right to assert a broad claim scope in litigation.74 Google correctly
gauged that the Supreme Court has a long history of construing amendments in
favor of the public and against the applicant,75 stating this as a major question in
both the petitions of Vederi76 and Cioffi.77 That intent continues into modern law in
Festo.78 The decision to amend a claim, rather than appeal the examiner's
rejection, is a “concession that the invention as patented does not reach as far as
the original claim.”79

72
Vederi, 744 F.3d 1376 (contesting that the Court’s decision not to strictly construe an amendment
against the patentee violated precedent).
73
See Crouch, supra note 23 (noting Google had asked the Supreme Court in Vederi to answer the
question: “Whether, when an applicant for a patent amends a claim to overcome the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s earlier disallowance of the claim, should a court (i) presume that the amendment
narrowed the claim and strictly construe the amended claim language against the applicant, as this
Court has held; or (ii) presume that the claim scope remained the same and require that any narrowing
be clear and unmistakable, as the Federal Circuit has held?” This question is “parallel” to the questions
raised in Cioffi).
74
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 31.
75
See Exhibit Supply, 315 U.S. at 137 (holding when an applicant amends their claim to overcome a
rejection, the amendment effectively “operates as a disclaimer and must be strictly construed against
the applicant and in favor of the public.”); Keystone Driller, 294 U.S. at 48.
76
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at i.
77
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i (citing Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. at
789–90; Hubbell, 179 U.S. at 84).
78
See Festo, 535 U.S. at 734 (asserting amendments should always be construed in favor of the public
and not the patentee and “[t]he decision to amend a claim, rather than appeal the examiner's rejection, is
a concession that the invention as patented does not reach as far as the original claim.”).
79
Id.
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B. The Federal Circuit’s current approach is not the opposite of strict
construction.
As explained in the previous section, the Supreme Court’s traditional
position is amendments made to overcome disallowance must be strictly construed
against the applicant.80 Google’s second question in its petition for certiorari in
both Vederi81 and Cioffi82 asks whether the Federal Circuit had applied a
disclaimer-only standard to claim amendments. In order to be true, evidence would
have to be presented that the Federal Circuit has viewed the amended claim
language as non-deserving of a different interpretation than the original claim
language unless a “clear and unmistakable disclaimer” of claim scope was found
in the prosecution history.83 Additionally, Google contends the Federal Circuit
construes the new language against the public by assuming a generously broad
scope.84 Such a construction leads to the undesirable result of a narrower claim
scope for applicants who clearly articulated reasons for their amendments during
the prosecution process,85 “unduly restricting the proper role of prosecution history
in construing the scope of patent claim language.”86
However, these claims are unsubstantiated.87 While legal commentary has
stated that the “Federal Circuit has strayed significantly from pre-1952 Supreme
Court precedent on disclaimer law,”88 as explicitly pointed out by Google in its
petition,89 they are not giving the complete picture. In the same article,90 the author
describes Google’s position as “quite misguided.”91 In light of this evidence,
Google’s argument that the Federal Circuit’s current approach is the opposite of
strict construction fails.

80
See Exhibit Supply Co., 315 U.S. at 137; Keystone Driller Co., 294 U.S. at 48; Smith, 282 U.S. at
789–790; I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 443–44 (1926).
81
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at i.
82
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i.
83
See Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1384.
84
See 3M Innovative Properties, 725 F.3d at 1326 (finding when “disavowal does not exist, the
ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term will be given its full effect”).
85
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 26.
86
See id.
87
See Dennis Crouch, Google Looks to Narrow both Copyrights and Patents through Supreme Court
Action, PATENLYO, (Jan. 13, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/copyrights-throughsupreme.html (asserting, despite Google’s contention, “the Federal Circuit does not presume that
amended claims maintain the identical scope following an amendment to overcome a rejection by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office”).
88
See Crouch, supra note 24.
89
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 24.
90
See Crouch, supra note 83.
91
Id.

114

LINGUISTICS

[101: 114]

Next, one must consider Google’s secondary position that panels of the
Federal Circuit have reached very different results on the issue of strict
construction.92 This alternative approach benefits the patentee more than a strict
construction, as it views amendments to the claims as the applicants own failure to
clarify (or intention not to clarify) and does not immediately understand the
amendment to operate as a disclaimer. However, this argument is made
nonsensical by a simple overview of the prosecution process.
The examination process begins with the filing of an application.93 After
the United States Patent and Trademark Office receives the application, it is
subjected to a substantive examination.94 During examination, the examiner may
reject an application through an office action, which explains the reasoning behind
the decision not to allow.95 Some of the most common rejections are based in the
reasoning that the invention was either anticipated by the prior art96 or that it was
obvious when considered in context of the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art.97
After reviewing the office action, the applicant may respond to the
examiner’s rejection by requesting reevaluation of the application or by amending
the claims, description, or drawings to overcome the examiner’s rejection.98 If the
applicant is successful in overcoming the rejection set forth in the Office action by
narrowing the claim, they will have secured a patent grant, but at the cost of
waiving the previous claim scope in the form of a disclaimer.99 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court’s decisions are not contradicted by Federal Circuit rulings100 and
the Federal Circuit’s decisions have not created an internal divide sufficient for the
Supreme Court to have granted Google’s petition for certiorari.

92
See Crouch, supra note 23 (noting a recent example of this was the case of Columbia University v.
Symantec, which was decided by Chief Judge Prost along with Judges Dyk and Huges, while the Cioffi
panel of Judges O’Malley, Plager, and Bryson “reached a different result in a similar situation applying
the same principle”).
93
3 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 3:15 (4TH ED. 2016).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
A specific claim of an invention may be rejected by the examiner when the invention is anticipated
(otherwise known as “not novel”) by a disclosure that is considered prior art. In order to be anticipated,
the disclosure in question must teach all elements of the claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
97
A patent claim may be rejected if the differences between the claimed subject matter of the invention
and the prior art are similar to the degree that the claimed invention would have been obvious before to
a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
98
3 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 3:18 (4TH ED. 2016).
99
See BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d at 1369 (explaining an amendment made to overcome rejection may
constitute a “clear disavowal” of claim scope).
100
See Poly-Am., No. 2016-1200; Fenner, 778 F.3d 1320 (“In this articulation of the process, both the
specification and the prosecution history play an important role.”).
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C. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s approach does not violate
the Nautilus standard by obscuring the public notice function of claims.
If Google’s argument that the contextual value of amendments made
during prosecution is being disregarded by the Federal Circuit, then determining a
specific claim term’s meaning in context would become very difficult.101 This
situation would likely question the validity of some claims under Nautilus102
because of the presumption that using vague terminology during prosecution will
benefit the patentee during claim construction.103
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a patent must define the
scope of the subject matter to which the right extends.104 Google uses this as a
final argument, specifically that the Federal Circuit has undermined the Supreme
Court’s prudential requirement that claims must be “reasonably certain.”105 If the
Federal Circuit’s “clear and unmistakable” standard compromises the publicnotice function of claims, it opens the door to the supposition that it may also
violate the recent Supreme Court precedent in Nautilus,106 which dictates that
written claims need to be “provide reasonable certainty”107 to be held valid. The
final meaning and interpretation of statutory language depends on its context, so it
follows that the meaning and clarity of a claim term are also context dependent.108
Especially for language amended or added during examination, the prosecution
history often provides relevant context.109 It is likely that a true conflict in
precedent within the Federal Circuit would violate the Nautilus standard, but here
this is not the case because the Federal Circuit does not currently presume that
claims amended during prosecution retain their original scope.110

101

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 17–23.
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
103
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 27–28 (“Allowing patentees to exploit such
ambiguities in court undermines the integrity of the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s] examination
process by making examiners’ efforts to confine patent claims to actual innovation much more difficult,
if not futile.”).
104
Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424, 12 S.Ct. 76, 77, 35
L.Ed. 800 (1891)) (holding “a patent must describe the scope of an invention and its manufacture to
‘secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is still open to
them.’”).
105
See Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court: To Be Valid, Patent Claims Must Provide Reasonable
Certainty Regarding the Claim Scope, PATENTLYO (Jun. 2, 2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/reasonable-certainty-regarding.html (explaining that to achieve the
notice function of claims, the Nautilus standard requires that claims must provide reasonable certainty
regarding the claim scope).
106
See Nautilus, supra note 102.
107
See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128 (finding, according to 35 U.S.C. § 112, a “patent's specification
‘shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same’”).
108
See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004).
109
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 23.
110
See Crouch, supra note 83.
102
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D. Festo does not control the question of literal interpretation of ambiguous
patent claim amendments.
A final topic to note from the petitions of Cioffi111 and Vederi112 is the
misapplication of Festo, a case that Google cites frequently in the petitions to
support its contention that Federal Circuit decisions have conflicted sharply with
Supreme Court precedent.113 The decision in Festo does not contribute to the body
of governing law used in the interpretation of claim language during construction;
rather, it is focused on the availability of the doctrine of equivalents in light of the
content of the prosecution history.114 This is an important distinction.
The doctrine of equivalents stands for the principle that a patent can be
infringed by something that is outside the claim scope of the patent, but does not
substantially differ in function because a certain feature or element has been
substituted.115 The Court explained the relationship between the doctrines, by
stating:
Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the
doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its
underlying purpose. Where the original
application once embraced the purported
equivalent but the patentee narrowed his
claims to obtain the patent or to protect its
validity, the patentee cannot assert that he
lacked the words to describe the subject matter
in question.116
This establishes that the amendments narrow the subject matter of the claims
because that is precisely what the patentee chose to do. It is this idea Google is
using in its argument when it quotes “claim amendments must be examined in
context of the prosecution history.” However, as previously established, Federal
Circuit law does not conflict with this idea.

111

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 734).
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 67, at 14.
113
Id.
114
See FISCHER, supra note 16.
115
See MPEP § 2186 (8th ed. Rev. 11, Nov. 2013).
116
Festo, 535 U.S. at 734.
112
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Furthermore, it was not the main focus of the Court, and is not a ground
for Google to assert that that the Federal Circuit is in violation of Supreme Court
precedent, as intention of the case was to hold that claim amendments do not
necessarily bar assertions under the Doctrine of Equivalents due to prosecution
history estoppel. Essentially, the holding of this case actually damages Google’s
argument of strict construction against the patentee because it allows for the
possibility that equivalents may be asserted even after estoppel, which arises when
an amendment narrows a patent’s scope. The Court summarized this point as
follows: “[b]y amending the application, the inventor is deemed to concede that
the patent does not extend as far as the original claim, that the amended claim
becomes so perfect in its description that no one could devise an equivalent.”117
The diagram below illustrates the difference between where Google cites
to Festo118 as controlling (finding the intended scope of inventive contribution)
and where Festo actually governs (the ability to invoke the doctrine of equivalents
to claim indirect infringement in light of a narrowing amendment constituting an
estoppel, or other limiting content of the prosecution history).

117
118

Id. at 738.
Id. at 724.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
definitively recognized that all intrinsic evidence is relevant to claim
construction119 in issues over literal claim interpretation. In order to avoid future
confusion over the correct application of Festo, its reference should be limited to
issues of amendment based prosecution history estoppel120 and post construction
availability of the doctrine of equivalents, neither of which was at issue in
Cioffi.121 Festo was not intended to govern the relevance of prosecution history to
claim construction as a whole, as other cases focus in on this issue much more
closely.122 As such, the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo does not clash with
Federal Circuit decisions determining the significance of prosecution history in
claim language disputes.
E. An evaluation of the reasoning behind the petitions for certiorari
damages Google’s position.
The debate over standards used during claim construction is important
because businesses, independent inventors, and the general public need to be able
to understand the scope of a patent’s right to exclude. If the claims, which define
the boundaries of that right,123 are ambiguous, the likelihood of accidental
infringement of that patent increases tremendously. Google’s petition for certiorari
went so far as to suggest that in addition to allowing vague or ambiguous claims,
the alleged division compromises the character of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office’s prosecution process.124
In Cioffi, the dispute over the term “web browser process” started when
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office asserted that the claim containing that term
was preempted by the prior art, and accordingly rejected Cioffi’s malware patent
claim.125 This naturally resulted in Cioffi’s patent attorney narrowing the claim to
describe a more specific process. The trial judge concluded Cioffi’s claim could
only refer to something else after reviewing this narrowing amendment in the
prosecution history, and concluded Google did not infringe.126 However, on
appeal, the Court sided with Cioffi because it determined it would look at the
prosecution history of the patent at issue only if it contained a “clear and
unmistakable” statement to support Google’s case.127
119
See Biogen Idec, 713 F.3d at 1094 (“[A] term’s ordinary meaning must be considered in the context
of all the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, specification, and prosecution history.”).
120
See Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence for Claim Construction, THE PATENT ANALYST (Feb. 10,
2014), https://thepatentanalyst.com/2014/02/10/intrinsic-and-extrinsic-evidence-for-claim-construction/
(explaining Festo applies in situations where “[A]MENDMENT-based prosecution history estoppel is
found, where a narrowing amendment is ‘made for a “substantial reason related to patentability,” when
the record does not reveal the reason for the amendment.’”).
121
See Cioffi, 632 F. App’x at 1014.
122
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1310 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd. 133 F.3d 1473,
1478 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The best source for understanding a technical term is the specification from
which it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.”)).
123
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424, (1891)) (“[A]
patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture to ‘secure to [the patentee] all
to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is still open to them.’”).
124
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 27.
125
Id. at 9.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 11.
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Accordingly, Google states that the “clear and unmistakable” standard is
too high of a bar, and that the Supreme Court should hear the case to remove
inconsistencies between Federal Circuit decisions. Google also alleged that the
uncertainty created by the divided Federal Circuit favors companies that abuse the
patent system; specifically, Google argued “[o]verbroad patent claims are a
plague, especially in the vital and growing high-tech sector. . . . All of this plays
into the hands of entities that buy patents and then use litigation or the threat of
litigation to extract settlements from alleged infringers.”128 Whether or not these
additional claims about the clear and unmistakable standard are true, the most
significant question to note behind the validity of the petition is whether the facts
of the case actually support Google’s extensive arguments.
If the Supreme Court were to accept certiorari for this case, it is unclear
whether the ruling would actually affect the outcome of the case.129 It is certainly a
controversial area of law, as evidenced by the amicus brief130 filed in the case of
Google, Inc. v. Vederi.131 Nine amici, including several major corporations such as
Dell and eBay, support Google’s assertion that the Federal Circuit’s “clear and
unmistakable” standard clearly departs from the Supreme Court’s precedent and
results in overbroad construction.132
Google’s arguments have attracted significant attention over the past several
years, but they are simply not appropriate for the Supreme Court to review,
because they are misguided and irrelevant to the actual facts of the case.133 It is
likely that Google keeps disputing the proper use of prosecution history because it
is unhappy with the Federal Circuit’s determination that nothing contained within
the prosecution history was particularity valuable in aiding the interpretive dispute.
IV. USING THE PROSECUTION AND AMENDMENT HISTORY AS PRAGMATIC SOURCES
WHEN INTERPRETING THE LITERAL LANGUAGE OF A PATENT CLAIM
In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals,134
the Federal Circuit reviewed the use of intrinsic evidence during claim
construction de novo.135 It also reviews the trial court’s factual findings based on
extrinsic evidence sources for clear error.136

128

Id. at 31.
Crouch, supra note 24 (asserting a critical question that may invalidate Google’s argument is
“whether Google’s legal argument is actually relevant to the facts-on-the-ground.”); Penton, supra note
25 (“Google . . . points to other decisions concerning unrelated legal matters in an attempt to convince
the Supreme Court” of a division in the Federal Circuit.).
130
Brief Of Acushnet Company, Dell Inc., Kaspersky Lab, Inc., Limelight Networks, Inc., Newegg
Inc., Qvc, Inc., Sas Institute Inc., Ebay Inc., And Xilinx, Inc. as Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioner,
Google, Inc. v. Vederi, LLC., 135 S. Ct. 2856 (No. 14-448), 2015 WL 2473390.
131
Vederi, 744 F.3d at 1376.
132
See Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioner, supra note 130 at 1.
133
See Penton, supra note 25.
134
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 U.S. 831, 841 (2015).
135
Id. at 841.
136
Id.
129
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A. The difference between pragmatic and semantic meaning.
The ultimate purpose of language is, of course, to communicate meaning.
The goal of using written language is to effectively and precisely convey the
message intended to be communicated.137 This process, by which an understanding
of a particular text is formed,138 depends not only upon the actual words, but also
encompasses relevant context and extends to information and knowledge shared
with the speaker.139 By definition then, all meaning, both semantic and pragmatic,
involve the use of context to a certain extent.140 The distinction between the two
comes primarily in that the field of semantics concentrates solely on the meaning
that the vocabulary and grammar impart, and does not take into account any
implied or underlying meaning.141 Pragmatic meaning, in contrast, looks to the
same vocabulary and grammar, but derives meaning based on context that gives
important subtext, which in turn, allows the derivation of a different understood
meaning.142 Accordingly, using a pragmatic approach often results in a different
understood meaning from that of a semantic approach, making it very important to
consult both semantic and pragmatic evidentiary sources to arrive at the most
accurate interpretation of the language in question, as the prosecution history is a
pragmatic source that needs to be allowed to effect the pragmatic meaning of the
claim language unrestricted.
B. Evidentiary sources are currently classified only as either extrinsic or
intrinsic.
Now that pragmatics and semantics have been defined, the next step is to
look at acceptable evidentiary sources used during claims construction and classify
them as semantic or pragmatic. Currently, these evidentiary sources are classified
and referred to as being extrinsic or intrinsic.143 Intrinsic evidence encompasses
the literal claim words, the specification, and the prosecution history.144 Extrinsic
sources are sources which are not a part of the written application.145 The proper
role, and view, of these sources by courts undertaking claim construction has
shifted notably over the years from strongly disfavored to favored, and recently
regressing back to being disfavored,146 though still allowed.147 In Phillips,148 the
Court stated that going forward, extrinsic evidence must be considered in the
context of the intrinsic evidence, as it is “less reliable than the patent and its
prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.”149
137

William Ladusaw, Meaning (Semantics and Pragmatics), LINGUISTIC SOCIETY OF AMERICA,
http://www.linguisticsociety.org/resource/meaning-semantics-and-pragmatics (last visited Mar. 24,
2017).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. (explaining the importance of context, as people “mean more than they say by considering the
same thing said in two different contexts”).
141
See Courtney Crass, What is Semantics?, BRIGHTHUB EDUCATION (Jun. 6, 2014),
http://www.brighthubeducation.com/english-homework-help/105856-understanding-pragmatic-vssemantic-meaning/.
142
Id.
143
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (“Although we have emphasized the importance of intrinsic evidence
in claim construction, we have also authorized district courts to rely on extrinsic evidence, which
‘consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor
testimony, dictionaries and learned treatises.’”).
144
What is Intrinsic Evidence?, THE LAW DICTIONARY,
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The diagram below classifies these evidentiary sources linguistically. The
only semantic source that is considered to be intrinsic evidence are the actual
claim words.150

Taking a purely semantic approach would result in claim language being
the only intrinsic evidence allowed. Once pragmatic sources are introduced, the
rest of the intrinsic evidence can then be consulted appropriately.

http://thelawdictionary.org/intrinsic-evidence/ (last viewed Mar. 24, 2017).
145
Extrinsic Evidence Law, U.S. LEGAL.COM, https://definitions.uslegal.com/e/extrinsic-evidence/ (last
viewed Mar. 24, 2017).
146
See Crouch, supra note 26 (From an early time period until 2002, extrinsic evidence was strongly
disfavored by the court. From 2002 until the decision in Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303, the court appeared to
regularly consult dictionaries, which are an extrinsic evidence source. The Phillips decision brought the
focus primarily to intrinsic evidence once again, but allows for the possibility if necessary to educate
the court on the art or what a person of ordinary skill in the art would take a given term to mean.).
147
After considering intrinsic evidentiary sources, a court may then seek guidance from extrinsic
evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–18.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 1318–19.
150
See Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evidence for Claim Construction, THE PAT. ANALYST (Feb. 10, 2014),
https://thepatentanalyst.com/2014/02/10/intrinsic-and-extrinsic-evidence-for-claim-construction/.
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C. Applying pragmatic and semantic principles to the process of claim
language construction.
This section suggests a simple approach that would help unify future
Federal Circuit decisions. When these basic linguistic categories are applied to
claim construction, it becomes clear that consulting the prosecution history and all
intrinsic evidence sources are critical context. This is not in dispute151 as it
contains essential sources created by the actual drafter.152 However, panels of the
Federal Circuit are essentially able to choose what intrinsic and, when the
situations allows, extrinsic evidentiary sources they deem most important during
claim construction. This results in opinions that stay within precedent, but lack in
consistency. Comparing the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Columbia
University v. Symantec153 to Cioffi154 exemplifies this assertion.155
As previously explained, the Federal Circuit panel in Cioffi156 found the
principle of claim differentiation more persuasive than Google’s prosecution
history disclaimer argument, because the Court did not find a clear disclaimer of
claim scope.157 In Columbia University,158 the relevant provisional application
included a statement that the contested byte sequence feature did not extend to
non-machine code “resource information.”159 That statement was removed before
the non-provisional application, but the Federal Circuit determined that the
original definition still applied, 160 as provisional applications are considered to be
part of the specification.161 This implies that the withdrawal of a statement is
insufficient.162 Rather, after a significant change, the patent applicant must take
steps to affirmatively identify the change to the examiner for their consideration or
risk unintentionally disclaiming the scope.163
151
See Biogen Idec, 713 F.3d at 1095 (“[A] term’s ordinary meaning must be considered in the context
of all the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, specification, and prosecution history.”).
152
The prosecution history contains the application, statements to the inventor specifically concerning
the intended claim scope, rejections of claims, responses by the applicant to rejections, and any
arguments made to overcome disallowance. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (“[L]ike the specification,
the prosecution history was created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the patent.”).
153
Trustees of Columbia University in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
154
Cioffi, 632 F. App’x 1013.
155
See Crouch, supra note 24.
156
Cioffi, 632 F. App’x 1013.
157
See Biogen Idec, No. 12-1120 (stating that "where found, prosecution history disclaimer can
overcome the presumption of claim differentiation.").
158
Trustees of Columbia University in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
159
See Dennis Crouch, Claim Construction Leads to Nonsensical Result and thus Indefiniteness,
PATENLYO, (Feb. 3, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/02/construction-nonsensicalindefiniteness.html.
159
Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359.
160
Id. at 1366.
161
See ADVANCED DISPLAY SYS., INC. V. KENT STATE UNIV., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (explaining referenced provisional applications are “effectively part of the” specification as
though it was “explicitly contained therein.”). Additionally, “Apart from the claim language itself, the
specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a claim term.” AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux
Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
162
Crouch, supra note 24.
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This treatment of the specification is exacting and places disclaimers
made during prosecution in very high regard, and is consistent with Google’s view
of how the prosecution history should be treated.164 In Cioffi,165 however, the
Federal Circuit considered claim differentiation to be more significant than
potential disclaimers made in the prosecution history.166 In essence, panels of the
Federal Circuit choose whether prosecution history, the claims, or the specification
should be given more weight in claim construction.
This is important because the “construction of patent claim plays a
critical role in nearly every patent case.”167 In the words of Judge Newman in
Fenner:168 “Words are symbols, linguistic embodiments of information sought to
be communicated, and, as such, can be imperfect at representing their subject.”
This sentiment is especially relevant in the field of technology, as many terms
used in claim language do not have an established meaning; these are the
situations that are likely to necessitate construction.169
This difference in opinion over the proper importance of different
intrinsic evidentiary sources could be reduced by considering the evidence from a
linguistic point of view. Through the lens of linguistics, it is clear that both
sematic and pragmatic sources should be used to arrive at an accurate construction
of an invention’s claim scope, which is depicted in the diagram below.

164

Crouch, supra note 24.
Cioffi, 632 F. App’x 1013.
166
Id. at 1019 (“We do not find, moreover, that anything in the prosecution history overcomes the
presumption created by these claim differentiation principles.”).
167
Crouch, supra note 26.
168
Fenner, 778 F.3d at 1323.
169
Id. (“When the disputed words describe technology, the terse usage of patent claims often requires
‘construction’ in order to define and establish the legal right.”).
165
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As is apparent in the diagram, linguistics dictates that the only way to
arrive at an accurate meaning is to utilize both the semantic and pragmatic sources
simultaneously. If courts used this simple thought process when weighing
evidentiary sources during claim construction, a greater degree of consistency
between opinions could likely be achieved through greater understanding of how
these important contextual resources confer meaning. Essentially, using a
linguistic view of intrinsic evidentiary sources, including the prosecution and
amendment history, could reduce preferential treatment of certain sources and
resolve the debate over what intrinsic sources are the most valuable.
V. CONCLUSION
The arguments Google presents in their petition170 for certiorari in
Cioffi171 raise important concerns about the restriction of intrinsic evidence in
claim construction. However, upon further analysis, it seems that the Supreme
Court rightly denied their petition for certiorari just as they did one year earlier in
Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc.172 This is because the arguments in each case seems to
be analogous.173 Therefore, among other reasons,174 it is highly questionable
whether a court ruling on the case would actually affect the outcome. Furthermore,
the Federal Circuit’s treatment of prosecution and amendment history is not nearly
as restrictive175 as Google claims,176 as the availability of all intrinsic evidence to
provide crucial context for establishing the meaning of a claim term that is the
subject of dispute is not in danger.177 Next, Google’s second argument also fails,
as the Federal Circuit presumes claim amendments narrow the claim’s scope
despite Google’s misguided allegation, and judges have the discretion to interpret
the effect of an amendment.178 Because the arguments presented were insufficient
to warrant review, the Supreme Court correctly denied Google’s petition for
certiorari.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i.
Cioffi, 632 F. App’x 1013.
See Vederi, 744 F.3d 1376.
173
Crouch, supra note 24.
174
Crouch, supra note 26.
175
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he best source for understanding a technical term is the specification from which
it arose, informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.”)); Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (“The
fundamental sources for claim construction are well-established and include the patent claims, the
specification and the prosecution history.”).
176
See Vederi, 744 F.3d 1376.
177
See Biogen Idec, 713 F.3d at 1095 (“[A] term’s ordinary meaning must be considered in the context
of all the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, specification, and prosecution history.”); BENQ Am.
Corp., 533 F.3d at 1369 (citing Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding because the
prosecution history was written by the applicant in an attempt to explain their invention to the
examiner, the prosecution history often informs how the inventor understood the invention)).
178
See Crouch, supra note 24 (asserting it is unsurprising that different three-judge panels reach a
different verdict than other three judge panels given the opinion of the judges, but noting that that
deviation in decisions does not cause a split in precedent).
171
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Finally, even though these intrinsic evidence sources are not
endangered179 by a conflict within the Federal Circuit the way Google asserts,
courts could benefit from bolstering their understanding of how evidentiary
sources acquire meaning through linguistics, as the minor variation in holdings180
between Federal Circuit panels indicate a selective approach in considering
available evidence. Viewing evidentiary sources using a linguistic classification
could increase the contextual understanding of a claim’s intended meaning by
contemplating both sematic and pragmatic meaning, and as a result, improve
consistency between Federal Circuit panels during claim construction.

179
180

See Biogen Idec, 713 F.3d at 1095; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1305.
See Crouch, supra note 24.

Cybaris®
Cybaris®, an Intellectual Property Law Review, publishes non-student articles and
student comments on all areas of intellectual property law, including patents,
copyrights, trademarks, licensing, and related transactional matters.
mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris

Intellectual Property Institute
Cybaris® is a publication of the Intellectual Property Institute at Mitchell Hamline
School of Law.
mitchellhamline.edu/ip

© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105

mitchellhamline.edu

